Fortune Magazine
November 28, 2005
PROZAC BACKLASH
Trouble in Prozac
by: DAVID STIPP
Can Prozac make you want to die? The idea seems strange, given
that the drug and similar antidepressants are supposed to do just the
opposite. Yet that is what Kimberly Witczak believes happened to her husband.
Two years ago Tim "Woody" Witczak killed himself at age 37, soon
after going on Pfizer's Zoloft--the top-selling member of Prozac's class of
drugs, known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, or SSRIs. Her husband
was an upbeat, happy man, says Kim Witczak. Shortly before his death he had
been named vice president of sales at a startup that sold energy-efficient
lighting. When anxiety about the new job caused insomnia, he was prescribed
Zoloft. He began suffering from nightmares, profound agitation, and eerie
sensory experiences after a couple of weeks on the medicine--at one point, she
says, he said he felt as if his head were detached from his body. Then he
seemed to calm down. But about five weeks after his first dose, he hanged
himself from the rafters in their garage when Kim was out of town. He left no
suicide note.
"Woody's death was the most out-of-the-blue, out-of-character
death," she told FORTUNE recently. "He had no history of mental
illness." Kim Witczak, who lives in Minneapolis, has sued Pfizer,
alleging that Zoloft induced the suicide and that the company failed to warn
about the drug's potential to cause perilous side effects. Pfizer declined to
comment while the case is in litigation, but a spokesman asserted that there
is "no scientifically based" evidence to suggest Zoloft can induce
violent acts. It's not the first time SSRI makers have faced complaints
related to suicide or other forms of violence. They have fended off or quietly
settled scores of such suits over the years without significant injury to
their drugs' reputations.
But the Witczak case, which may play out in court next spring, is likely to
put SSRIs on trial as never before. For one thing, Kim Witczak has emerged as
a formidable crusader. Poised and articulate, she has appeared at
congressional and Food and Drug Administration hearings (most recently this
month) to tell of her tragedy and the dangers of SSRIs. What's more, her suit
is likely to spotlight disturbing information that drug companies and U.S.
regulators have been aware of for years--but that most doctors prescribing the
drugs have known little or nothing about.
Controversy about SSRIs' side effects flared into national prominence last
year when they and older antidepressants were shown to double the risk of
suicidal thoughts and behavior in children and adolescents. That discovery
prompted the FDA to slap a stern "black box" warning on the drugs'
package inserts. (Among other things, it cautions doctors to monitor young
patients closely in their first months on SSRIs.)
A black-box warning about suicidal thoughts and behavior in adults may very
well be next, say a number of experts interviewed by FORTUNE. "I'm fully
expecting that the same [risk found in young patients] will be found in
adults," says Dr. Richard Kapit, an ex-FDA official who handled the
agency's first safety review of Prozac before its approval in 1987. (He now
works as a medical writer and consultant in Bethesda, Md.) In fact, last
summer the FDA warned that several recent studies suggest that SSRIs and other
antidepressants raise the risk of suicidal behavior in adults as well as kids.
The agency added that it is reviewing "all available data" on the
issue in an investigation expected to take a year or more.
Risk of suicide isn't the only problem dogging SSRIs. For example,
GlaxoSmithKline faces thousands of lawsuits on another side effect, severe
withdrawal reactions to its drug Paxil, one of the fastest-acting SSRIs. Last
year British policymakers moved to discourage the use of SSRIs to treat mild
depression. And a recent scientific analysis has challenged long-held
assumptions about how the drugs work. That could undercut drugmakers'
assertions that SSRIs are well understood, potentially increasing doubts about
their safety.
A black-box warning for adults could have huge repercussions, vaporizing
billions of dollars of future sales, increasing pressure on policymakers to
curtail direct-to-consumer drug ads, and prompting a slew of lawsuits. It
could also complicate drugmakers' efforts to roll out new antidepressants to
replace current ones as the drugs go off patent. The ultimate fallout could
well equal or exceed that from Vioxx, the Merck painkiller whose saga of
potentially lethal risks, dodgy marketing, and damaging courtroom disclosures
has given Big Pharma the look of an ethical disaster zone. If so, it would add
a sad twist to a tale in which so many people have been helped.
Birth of a Blockbuster
Prozac and its kin have been one of 20th-century medicine's great success
stories. Since the debut of Eli Lilly's Prozac in 1988, the drugs have grown
into an $ 11-billion-a-year market in the U.S. alone. Nearly 150 million U.S.
prescriptions were dispensed in 2004 for SSRIs and similar antidepressants
called SNRIs, according to IMS Health, a Fairfield, Conn., drug data and
consulting company--more than for any other drug except codeine. Perhaps one
out of 20 adult Americans are on them now, making brands like Zoloft,
GlaxoSmithKline's Paxil, Forest Laboratories' Celexa, and Solvay
Pharmaceuticals' Luvox household names. Though they don't work for
everybody--many people have gone off the medicines because of side effects
such as dampening of sexual response--they've done more than any other class
of drugs to spur psychiatry's substitution of pills for couches.
In fact, we're popping so many SSRIs that their breakdown products in urine,
gushing into waterways, have accumulated in fish tissues, raising concerns
that aquatic animals may be getting toxic doses, according to recent research
at Baylor University.
The SSRI phenomenon began almost the minute Prozac appeared. Doctors embraced
the drugs because of a virtue that seems increasingly ironic: It's hard to
commit suicide by overdosing on SSRIs, so they are deemed safer to give to
severely depressed patients than are older, more acutely toxic antidepressants
such as the so-called tricyclics. Indeed, the drugs once seemed so benign that
some psychiatrists marveled about how they appear to violate the law of
"conservation of mood"--a seemingly universal pattern in which
drug-induced emotional lifts are always followed by crashes, resulting in no
net gain. Such talk made Prozac seem safer than coffee. That paved the way for
massive prescribing by general practitioners with no special training in
complex mental disorders--in recent years some 70% of SSRI prescriptions have
been written by primary-care doctors.
Within three years of Prozac's launch, annual sales neared $ 800 million.
Newsweek put the pill on its cover--a green-and-white capsule floating against
a blue sky under a headline that hailed it as a breakthrough drug. Even
healthy people were asking for Prozac, the magazine noted. By 1993 the idea
caught on that SSRIs could transform lives--curing not only depression but
also shyness, low self-esteem, and compulsiveness. Major boosts for the fad
came from Listening to Prozac, psychiatrist Peter Kramer's eloquent
bestseller, and from celebrity endorsements. Recounting his fight with
depression, Mike Wallace of CBS's 60 Minutes told Newsweek he expected to take
Zoloft for the rest of his life.
But for all the glow about SSRIs, the drugs have been among the most
controversial in the history of medicine. Bitter disputes about side effects
have seethed for more than a decade, usually out of sight of the mainstream
media--in supermarket tabloids, on websites, and in professional gatherings of
scientists, regulators, and shrinks.
Rare, dangerous side effects of potent medicines like antidepressants often
emerge only after the drugs have been prescribed to millions of people for
years. But in the case of SSRIs, that is not the whole story. There are signs
that manufacturers have downplayed known risks of the lucrative drugs and that
regulators and doctors haven't been skeptical enough about them.
Even the theoretical basis for prescribing SSRIs is now in doubt. The drugs
have long been said to work by boosting a brain chemical called serotonin,
correcting a neural imbalance underlying depression and other ills. That makes
them seem the epitome of modern medicine--what could be safer than restoring a
natural balance? A growing body of studies casts doubt on the theory, however,
according to a provocative report this month in PLoS Medicine, an influential
peer-reviewed journal published by the nonprofit Public Library of Science.
The report points out that scientists have never really understood the drugs'
effects in the brain. Yet pharmaceutical ads still cite the serotonin theory
as a major reason for prescribing SSRIs--a case of mythmaking "comparable
to the masturbatory theory of insanity," says British psychiatrist David
Healy, a longtime SSRI critic. Drug company spokesmen counter that
considerable scientific literature supports the serotonin-imbalance idea.
A number of scientists have theorized that while boosting serotonin, SSRIs
indirectly inhibit another key neurochemical messenger called dopamine. That
means the drugs may actually create a perilous brain imbalance in some people.
What's more, there's some evidence that dopamine inhibition underlies several
of the rare, serious side effects linked to SSRIs. One is akathisia, a kind of
extreme restlessness that has been implicated in suicidal impulses--Witczak
believes Zoloft induced akathisia in her husband.
The possibility that SSRIs may occasionally induce deranged mental states
conducive to homicide has cropped up again and again in the news. While
evidence supporting that idea is scanty compared with data on the risk of
suicidal ideas and behavior, it isn't easily dismissed out of hand. Consider
some of the testimony at the trial this year of teenager Christopher Pittman,
charged with murdering his grandparents. Richard Kapit, the ex--FDA official,
testified for the defense--he says he felt compelled to come forward after
reading about the case in the news. Kapit told the jury that the teen was
"involuntarily intoxicated" by SSRIs when he shot his grandparents.
Kapit added that he believes that Pittman, who was being tried as an adult and
who was ultimately found guilty, "didn't have the ability to form
criminal intent" when he committed the murders at age 12.
Many psychiatrists feel that stories about SSRIs' side effects should
themselves carry bold cautions against media hype. The risk noted in the FDA
black-box warning last year is limited: Suicidal thoughts and behaviors
occurred in about 4% of youngsters on antidepressants (mostly SSRIs) in
clinical trials, vs. 2% of those taking dummy pills. That doesn't necessarily
mean actual suicides occur more often among SSRI takers--there's too little
data to answer that question. And the risk must be balanced against the fact
that SSRIs help many people--no one disputes that depression is a huge
problem, and even some of SSRIs' harshest critics concede the drugs can play a
valuable role in treating it when prescribed judiciously.
The uproar, in fact, may be hurting some patients without access to
psychotherapy, the main alternative to drugs. Since family doctors are now
often afraid to prescribe SSRIs to kids, more depressed young people than ever
are probably going untreated, says Gregory Simon, a psychiatrist and
health-care policy researcher at Group Health Cooperative, a Seattle HMO.
Prescriptions of antidepressants for patients 18 and under have plunged by 20%
since the suicide issue hit headlines in early 2004, according to NDCHealth,
an Atlanta health-care information provider. (Less than 5% of antidepressant
prescriptions are written for youngsters.) Says Jerrold Rosenbaum,
psychiatrist-in-chief at Boston's Massachusetts General Hospital: "Most
of us [in psychiatry] think the number of patients harmed by failure to treat
[due to fear of SSRIs] is much higher than the number who are harmed by
treatment."
Of course, many top U.S. psychiatrists, including Dr. Rosenbaum, have worked
with drug companies to establish SSRIs as medicines of choice for treating
depression. Their views aren't universal in medicine--European authorities
have long been more skeptical about the drugs. Soon after the FDA approved
Prozac for marketing in December 1987, German regulators rejected it, partly
because of concerns that the drug increased the risk of suicide; they later
approved it but required Lilly to include a warning in the drug's package
insert about the possible need to prescribe sedatives to counter the risk.
Last December, Britain's National Institute for Clinical Excellence, which
guides that country's health-care policy, recommended that SSRIs and other
antidepressants not be prescribed "for the initial treatment of mild
depression, because the risk-benefit ratio is poor."
And in April the British House of Commons Health Committee issued a caustic
report that may give a preview of things to come in Congress. SSRIs have been
"indiscriminately prescribed on a grand scale," the committee
concluded, partly due to "data secrecy and uncritical acceptance of drug
company views." Further, industry promotions have "worked to
persuade too many professionals that they can prescribe [the drugs] with
impunity" to treat "unhappiness [that] is part of the spectrum of
human experience, not a medical condition." Though Congress isn't likely
to buy into the stiff-upper-lip rationale, it may put some very awkward
questions about SSRIs to their makers and the FDA in coming months. (Texas
Republican Joe Barton and other Congressmen grilled FDA officials for hours
just before the agency put the black-box warning on SSRIs for kids.)
"Ownable syndromes"
Drug marketers have been extraordinarily adept at selling SSRIs--even to
people who may not need them. Consider that the drugs, once limited to
treating major depression, are now prescribed for everything from shyness
about peeing in public restrooms to shopoholism. (Such uses aren't approved by
the FDA, but there's no law against doctors prescribing SSRIs and other drugs
for "off label" indications.)
The explosive growth of the drugs' market is largely a story of clever
branding as makers of "me too" SSRIs sought to replicate Prozac's
success. Pfizer, for example, positioned Zoloft, launched in 1992, as a
versatile antidepressant that could also treat ills such as post-traumatic
stress disorder. Glaxo targeted Paxil, launched in 1993, at anxiety disorders
such as SAD (social anxiety disorder, or excessive shyness) and GAD
(generalized anxiety disorder, or unremitting angst)--ills that had received
little attention before Glaxo began promoting Paxil to treat them. Lilly
countered by expanding Prozac's indications to include PMDD (premenstrual
dysphoric disorder, or very bad moods some women suffer before their periods)
and depression in children.
Indeed, to marketers, SSRIs have been the pharmaceutical equivalent of Play-Doh.
In a remarkably forthright 2003 article, Vince Parry, now a branding expert at
Ventiv Health, a Somerset, N.J., health-care marketing firm, waxed euphoric
about psychiatry's "ownable syndromes." Published in a trade
journal, the article laid out strategies "for fostering the creation of a
[medical] condition and aligning it with a product" like an SSRI. Wrote
Parry: "No therapeutic category is more accepting of condition branding
than the field of anxiety and depression, where illness is rarely based on
measurable physical symptoms." He cites Lilly's positioning of Prozac to
treat premenstrual woe as an excellent example of condition branding--the
company reinvigorated its aging antidepressant by repackaging it in a lavender
pill, dubbed Sarafem, for women with PMDD.
But blaming marketers alone for the SSRI fad isn't fair. Doctors, insurers,
regulators--and we eager pill-poppers--are co-conspirators. Cupertino, Calif.,
resident Ada Spade, for instance, takes an SSRI for a condition that even few
psychiatrists know about: compulsive shopping. The problem started about 15
years ago when she was in her 30s, she says. "I'd go to the grocery store
and find myself stopping at eight stores on the way to buy something in every
one of them. I just could not stop." She tried therapy, budgeting,
cash-only purchasing--nothing had lasting effect. Her life changed a few years
ago when she took part in a study at Stanford University Medical Center.
Funded by Forest Laboratories, it showed that 17 of 24 "compulsive
shoppers" given Celexa, an SSRI made by Forest, were greatly
improved--they could even visit malls without buying anything. "I learned
from the study," she says, "that, yeah, something is a little wrong
with me, but with medication I can be okay."
For harried doctors faced with lots of patients complaining of depression,
anxiety, or compulsions, drugs billed as versatile and safe can seem a
godsend. Prescribing SSRIs "has almost become a way that physicians are
regulating demands on their time," says University of Pennsylvania
psychology professor James Coyne. "What happens a lot in primary care,
though, is that people on the drugs don't get adequate follow-up. About half
the time they need an adjustment in dose, which they often don't get,"
increasing the chance of side effects.
That effectively means a double whammy of risk: It raises the odds that rare
patients vulnerable to dangerous reactions will get the drugs as well as the
chance that they will spin out of control unmonitored by doctors. Even when
patients are monitored, emerging suicidal tendencies are often missed, says
Jerome Vaccaro, CEO of PacifiCare Behavioral Health, a mental-health-benefits
manager in Santa Ana, Calif. "It's a 'don't ask, don't tell'
problem," he says. "Doctors don't ask about it, and patients don't
spontaneously volunteer they're feeling suicidal." To SSRI critics, these
nitty-gritty considerations should have prompted sterner warnings years ago.
Asserts psychiatrist Joseph Glenmullen: "The problem is that when you
give these drugs to a large population, you can get lethal side effects."
Mother's Little Helpers
If one had to identify when the sea change on SSRIs started, April 2000 would
be a top candidate. That's when Glenmullen, a clinical instructor at Harvard
who also works for its student health service, published a book called Prozac
Backlash. Playing up SSRI side effects via scary patient vignettes, the book
has become to the drugs' bashers what Listening to Prozac was to their fans.
Glenmullen sipped tea recently at a Cambridge, Mass., coffee shop while laying
out provocative historical parallels for the rise and possible fall of SSRIs.
Drug fads in psychiatry, he says, have appeared "like clockwork" in
30-year cycles. The first was cocaine elixirs, which doctors in the late 1800s
prescribed for everything from depression to shyness. Freud bolstered the fad
by commending cocaine in influential papers. But by the 1920s, cocaine's
dangers had become clear, and amphetamines replaced it as psychiatric
cure-alls. In the late 1930s uppers like Benzedrine were even sold over the
counter to treat nasal congestion. After the dangers of amphetamines rose to
the fore, the pattern was repeated with barbiturates and later with
habit-forming tranquilizers such as Valium. (Remember "mother's little
helpers," from the Rolling Stones song in the 1960s?)
Each fad followed the same trajectory. The medicines were first hailed as
wonder drugs for major mental illnesses. Then general practitioners began
prescribing them not just for major problems but for all sorts of relatively
minor maladies. Next, scattered reports of serious side effects appeared.
After 20 years or so of use, sellers of the medicines could no longer
plausibly deny the problems, leading finally to sharply curtailed prescribing.
Given that SSRIs' popularity took off in 1990, Glenmullen predicts that
"we're still five to ten years away" from full disenchantment with
them.
Very few doctors agree with his view that SSRIs are as problematic as, say,
amphetamines. But a number of his positions--such as the charge that drug
companies have selectively used clinical trial data on SSRIs to paint an
overly rosy picture of them--no longer seem radical. Says Group Health's Dr.
Simon: "The real scandal [about SSRIs] has been the failure to disclose
data." Take the revelations that led the FDA to impose the black-box
warning about prescribing SSRIs for kids. The story began in 2003 when FDA
officials noticed a curious thing while examining the results of a trial with
youngsters on Glaxo's Paxil: The company reported that substantially more kids
had shown "emotional lability" on the drug than on a placebo.
Emotional lability? When the officials asked what the term meant, Glaxo
submitted details showing that "almost all of these events related to
suicidality," according to an FDA internal e-mail on the matter in June
2003. (Suicidality is shrink-speak for suicidal ideas or actions; the e-mail
was eventually made public at a congressional hearing but got scant media
attention.) The implication of higher suicidality on Paxil "has us
worried," the FDA's Dr. Russell Katz noted in the message, which he sent
to colleague Dr. Andrew Mosholder, an expert on drug safety. Glaxo, he noted
acidly, "has not proposed labeling changes [on Paxil to reflect the
discovery], and makes a feeble attempt to dismiss the finding." Agency
officials launched a massive reexamination of trial data on antidepressants in
children.
That inquiry turned up worrisome data on suicide-related risk--information
that caused internal dissension at the FDA. Just before an FDA advisory panel
hearing on the issue, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that senior agency
officials had forbidden Mosholder to go public with his findings on the risk.
The agency's top brass feared that the data, which were still tentative, might
discourage doctors from giving antidepressants to kids who needed them. But
the focus of criticism soon shifted back to Glaxo. In June 2004, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued the company, alleging that it had
fraudulently withheld unfavorable data on youngsters treated with Paxil. (Glaxo,
which asserts that the lawsuit was "unfounded," settled by agreeing
to post its clinical results on the web.) Last October the FDA finally
confirmed that the suicide-related risk is real for a wide array of
antidepressants and required the stern warning on their labels.
Clean Bill of Health?
For years, FDA officials had reason to be perplexed. SSRI makers have long
maintained there's no reliable scientific evidence that SSRIs cause suicidal
or aggressive behavior. Other key factors, like mind-boggling medical
complexity, helped obscure the issue. For instance, depression itself can
increase suicidal thoughts and behaviors, which makes it extremely difficult
to tell whether a drug is to blame. Further, doctors have long believed that
antidepressants sometimes "energize" depressed patients before
lifting their moods--potentially making them more prone to enact their
despair. But over the past 15 years critics have amassed a small mountain of
data that point to suicide-related side effects, including reams of medical
journal reports, internal FDA memorandums obtained with Freedom of Information
Act filings, and unpublished industry documents pried out via discovery in
lawsuits.
The commotion about suicide risks dates back to 1990, when Harvard
psychiatrist Martin Teicher and colleagues reported that six of their
depressed patients had developed "intense, violent suicidal
preoccupation" soon after starting on Prozac. The report sparked
sensational media stories on the drug's purported dangers. But studies soon
made the case that Prozac is no more dangerous than older antidepressants and
possibly much safer. The scare was further deflated by revelations that the
anti-psychiatry Church of Scientology had helped promote it. In September
1991, an FDA advisory panel concluded there was "no credible
evidence" that Prozac promotes suicidal or violent impulses.
A far less reassuring analysis had unfolded behind the scenes, according to
internal FDA documents. The documents were later obtained by attorneys
representing plaintiffs who sued Lilly, alleging that Prozac had triggered
suicidal and violent acts. Lilly has quietly paid an estimated $ 50
million--plus to settle more than 30 such suits, according to an investigation
in 2000 by the Indianapolis Star. "Any settlements were based upon
business decisions," says Lilly spokesman Dan Collins. "We do not
comment on specific details regarding lawsuits."
A few months after Teicher's report, an FDA safety official wrote to his
superiors sharply criticizing a study Lilly had submitted to the agency in
hopes of quelling the suicide concerns. The memo's author, David Graham, is
the same official who made headlines last year by publicly lambasting the
FDA's handling of Vioxx. His 1990 memo about Prozac argued that Lilly's
"analysis of suicidality does not resolve the issue" because the
company had excluded cases of patients who weren't in the company's main
clinical trials--Graham had access to data from early Prozac studies that were
separate from the ones the drugmakers emphasized. "It can be argued that
these exclusions are not justified or appropriate," he wrote. This
"apparent large-scale underreporting" of patients with
"treatment-emergent suicidality" meant Lilly had not proved that
Prozac and violent behavior are unrelated, he argued. Yet when it came time
for the FDA to conduct the crucial hearing in 1991, Graham's analysis wasn't
mentioned and Prozac was exonerated. The clean bill of health is well
deserved, Lilly maintains. "More than 54 million patients worldwide have
taken Prozac," says Collins; it's "among the most studied
medications in history," and its safety "is thoroughly
documented."
Yet critics blame the FDA's response largely on coziness between the agency
and Big Pharma--and on senior officials' fear of looking careless. Says Kapit:
"There's definitely a reluctance by the FDA to come out and say, 'A drug
we've approved is really dangerous.'" The problem is compounded, he adds,
by the fact that the FDA unit charged with monitoring drugs' post-launch
safety is subsumed under the FDA branch that oversees drug approvals. The
drug-safety office has no autonomy to go public with its findings. If it
could, Graham's analysis of the Prozac data might have come out as early as
1991. (The FDA did not respond to repeated requests for comment.)
An Injection of Itching Powder
SSRIs' darkest side may be the suicide risk. But other adverse effects may
pose just as big a problem for drugmakers. In the mid-1990s, for example,
horror stories about SSRI withdrawal symptoms began circulating on the
Internet, signaling a controversy that is now nearly as bitter as the one
about suicide. One of its leading crusaders, Rob Robinson, a building
contractor in Signal Mountain, Tenn., recently organized a protest against
GlaxoSmithKline at its U.S. headquarters in Philadelphia. He held a BOYCOTT
GLAXOSMITHKLINE sign as he paced the sidewalk in front of the high-rise
building along with a handful of fellow protesters.
A rock climber of renown--Climbing magazine once put him on its
cover--Robinson, 45, says his experience with SSRIs started in 1998. He had
committed to do a traveling exhibition on climbing, but the project stressed
him out and interfered with his sleep, so his doctor prescribed Glaxo's Paxil.
After a few weeks on the drug, Robinson says, "I felt calmer. I thought,
'That's good.'" Quitting it after a half-year, though, "I started
having what I now know are withdrawal symptoms," he asserts, including
muscle spasms, extreme sensitivity to sound, and "horrible electric-shock
sensations in my head." He went back on Paxil to alleviate the symptoms.
Eventually concluding he had a drug dependency, he found a specialist who took
him off the drug in 18 days. That triggered severe symptoms that Robinson
claims brought him to the brink of suicide. "I finally opened a door at
the far side of hell after about 18 months," he says.
Today Robinson runs a website on Paxil's risks and has sued Glaxo, charging
that it deliberately failed to warn about the drug's potential to cause severe
withdrawal symptoms. Some 3,000 similar suits against Glaxo have been filed
across the country over the past few years, says Karen Barth Menzies, an
attorney at Baum Hedlund, a Los Angeles law firm that has handled many SSRI-related
suits.
Glaxo's drug has become the withdrawal issue's main lightning rod because it
washes out of the body more quickly than most other SSRIs. Hence the effects
of its absence in the brain can occur with literally dizzying speed. (Doctors
recommend gradually tapering doses before quitting to minimize such symptoms.)
The symptoms of SSRI "discontinuation syndrome," as psychiatrists
call it, include dizziness, headaches, nausea, lethargy, insomnia,
irritability, visual disturbances, movement disorders, and electric-shock
sensations (known as "electric head" on web chat groups about SSRIs).
Glaxo concedes that such symptoms may occur when people quit taking Paxil
abruptly. Discontinuation symptoms, a spokeswoman notes, can also occur with
other medicines, such as blood-pressure drugs. But she says allegations that
Paxil is addictive, or that Glaxo has tried to hide data on side effects, are
groundless. Most discontinuation symptoms, she adds, are "mild to
moderate in intensity, resolve on their own within two weeks, and seldom need
corrective therapy." It remains to be seen how well such assertions will
play in a courtroom if the withdrawal lawsuits, which are still in pretrial
proceedings, aren't settled first.
The most consequential SSRI side-effects lawsuit on the industry's horizon,
however, appears to be the Witczak case against Pfizer--the one involving the
man who hanged himself after taking Zoloft. The symptoms Woody Witczak
purportedly experienced suggest the restlessness-causing condition called
akathisia. It was first linked to the antidepressants in the 1980s; critics
like Glenmullen assert that it is one of SSRIs' most dangerous side effects,
in part because it is rarely seen, hence easily missed, by general
practitioners who prescribe the drugs. Ironically, a former Pfizer researcher
wrote one of the medical literature's most detailed articles on the subject
while working for the company. His report, which appeared in the Journal of
Psychopharmacology in 1998, states that SSRIs "may occasionally
induce" akathisia. The condition's name comes from the Greek for
"not sitting still," and its cardinal symptom is intense jitters--a
patient who has experienced the sensation compares it to an intravenous
injection of itching powder. Akathisia is so unbearable for some depressed
patients on SSRIs that they apparently feel "death is a welcome
result," according to the report.
An internal Pfizer memo on the akathisia report may backfire on the company.
Obtained by Kimberly Witczak's attorneys in pretrial proceedings, it makes the
remarkable statement, "This article is not suited for distribution to
general practitioners, but may be of interest to neurobiologically inclined
psychiatrists." Was Pfizer leery of scaring GPs away from Zoloft?
Responds company spokesman Bryant Haskins: "It's a bit absurd to allege
that Pfizer thought the paper revealed some serious health issue and [then]
decided to keep the information hidden by publishing it in a medical
journal." He adds that the paper "makes crystal-clear that the
scientific basis for any causal connection between SSRIs and akathisia is very
weak."
The SSRI backlash is being fueled by people across the political spectrum. Dr.
Sidney Wolfe of the liberal watchdog group Public Citizen in Washington, D.C.,
for example, has long argued that the drugs are overprescribed; conservative
activists such as Phyllis Schlafly have launched campaigns against prescribing
SSRIs and other psychiatric drugs to children based on mental-health
screening programs.
How the controversy will affect Big Pharma revenues and profits isn't clear,
though. Since generic SSRIs are now on the market (Prozac's U.S. patent
expired in 2001), drugmakers are racing to bring out new versions of
antidepressants. Concerns about SSRIs may help speed the transition to such
pricier, patent-protected alternatives, offsetting the controversy's fiscal
fallout. Or the new drugs could themselves be damaged by the skepticism that
has besieged the industry.
The FDA's scrutiny certainly seems to have intensified. Last year Lilly
launched a successor to Prozac called Cymbalta. It's an SNRI, a class of drugs
that has been hailed as offering significant advantages over SSRIs, such as
faster action. (SNRIs are touted as targeting two different chemical
messengers in the brain instead of just serotonin, as SSRIs do.) A few months
later Lilly dropped plans to seek approval for the drug as a treatment for
urinary incontinence in women. Last July the FDA revealed in a public alert
that "a higher than expected rate of suicide attempts was observed"
in clinical trials with incontinence patients on Cymbalta. Increased suicide
risks hadn't been seen in earlier trials of the drug. (A Lilly spokesman says
that the Cymbalta suicide-attempt rate, while higher than the rate for the
U.S. population, is "consistent" with worldwide suicide rates.) Such
problems may someday be resolved by genetic testing. It could take the
guesswork out of determining which patients a drug might help and which it
might hurt.
Waiting for her day in court, Kim Witczak appeared at another Washington,
D.C., forum this month--an FDA public hearing on direct-to-consumer drug ads.
"Prescription drugs ... should not be treated in the same manner as cars,
soap, or fast food," she told agency officials. Safety has to be No. 1,
she added, and all serious side effects ought to be communicated "in a
clear, concise, and honest manner, not just those that won't scare people away
from thinking twice about taking the drug."
Witczak's comments sounded like points her attorney is likely to make to a
jury. But as a success formula for the post-Prozac era, transparency might be
just the prescription that pharmaceutical marketers need.
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